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THE LEGITIMIZING ROLE OF THE LEADER
KONRAD ADENAUER, 1949-1976
Peter H . Merkl+
This is an examination of the changing leadership image of Adenauer
in the light of Institut für Demoskopie polls between 1949 and 1976.
It seeks to relate the leadership role to the legitimacy of the Fed-
eral Republic in the eyes of the mass public, leaving aside other
aspects of legitimacy for the time being
. Three public opinion curves
are plotted : Adenauer's general policy approval, the vote for his
party, and his image as an historical figure which grew especially
after he left office and after his demise . The posthumous public
assessments of his leadership in 1968 and 1975 clearly relate his
leadership to the legitimacy of the internal order and external
stature of the system . These bits and pieces of evidence, finally,
are contrasted with various hypotheses of legitimacy roles of leaders.
Legitimacy is created when a) most people feel they never had it
better; b) moderate parties engage in recurrent competition and a
stable party system emerges ; or c) when a leader manages to stay at
the helm for a long series of years and, at the same time, is per-
ceived to have tackled and solved major national problems.
"I have always said that the
great statesmen you read
about were all politicians.
They become statesmen after
they are in their graves ."
- Harry S . Truman -
As Glenn Paige has shown in his immensely erudite survey of the lit-
erature on political leadership,(1) scholarly curiosity about the
phenomenon of leadership has been as pervasive as the conceptual
focus has been blurred . There are many suggestive formulations but
no agreement on what it is or how it should be studied . From Max
Weber to Karl Deutsch and David Easton, there have been, in parti-
cular, ideas about how "charisma" or "personal legitimacy" might
contribute to the "diffuse support for authorities and regimes ."(2)
Lewis Edinger at an early point contributed interdisciplinary per-
spectives on the study of the "central actor's" focal postition in
juxtaposition to various counterpositions in the drama of large-group
leadership,(3) a perspective we will come back to below . Lester Selig-
man and Dankwart Rustow, no less than Paige himself, called for a
systematic political science approach to leadership, (4) one that
would link personality to institutional study without getting side-
tracked by the abstruse vocabularies of individual psychology or
Address all communications to : Peter H
. Merkl,
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political behavior.
Where comparative theory fails to shine the light, the practice of
comparative study always prefers to begin inductively with concrete
cases . The role of Konrad Adenauer during the formative first 14
years of the Federal Republic lends itself particularly well to the
study of the legitimizing role of leadership because
a) there are excellent empirical data available on the mass
perceptions of his image;
b) a fair amount is known about his relations to German elites;
c) there is by now the advantage of a certain distance in time;
d) the nature of his "leadership tasks" and his success with
them was clearly known to his audiences ; and
e) there is, happily, not much charismatic enigma or other
mumbo-jumbo about the man and his role.
Before tackling the analysis of the concrete evidence, it is essen-
tial that at least a few theoretical assumptions be made explicit in
order to guide this enterprise
. We agree with Leon Dion that "leader-
ship is a relationship best studied within the framework of the
group process, "(S) and that ordinarily we ought to examine not only
mass public opinion, but also the role of the communications media
and of the leader's relationship to the elites in general and his
party and allies in particular
. However, the space available does
not permit us to go into all this beyond the mere mention of it . Suf-
fice it to stress in particular Adenauer's ability to win and main-
tain the support of the Christian Democratic movement (CDU/CSU) in
whose organization and development he played a major part .(6) With-
out the rise of this mass movement to the right of the political cen-
ter, he could never have succeeded . It should not surprise us to find
the foundation of it as one of the "great achievements" for which
the West German public posthumously gave him credit.
The other important precondition of legitimizing leadership lay in
the correspondence between Adenauer's ideas and the "important group
tasks . . .as perceived by the group members," to speak with Dion .(7)
Adenauer's concept of Germany's options in the bipolar world after
1945 were already clearly formed at the end of World War II, as his
correspondence has revealed . It only took circumstances and his own
ambition to put the right man in the right spot for a fleeting moment
in history . His ideas of West German integration into the Western
alliance came just when the then omnipotent United States needed
German cooperation and thus became a major vehicle for the rehabili-
tation of his country . Without this correspondence between opportunity
and leadership, he would never have achieved greatness.
Finally, we can take for granted the personality and special skills
he had to have for his leadership role . He had to be very clever and
tough, two of his often cited characteristics . Both of these are am-
biguous in the eyes of the beholder and can easily turn into ruthless
domineering . He also had to have that special ability to dramatize
his own leadership before his people and the world,(8) to manipulate
the media, to make the masses understand the complex strategies he
was proposing and to retain the following among the elites he needed.
His leadership style was unique but not particularly noteworthy un-
less we consider the fact that he had to follow and top the consum-
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mate leadership act put on by Adolf Hitler, whose devastating effect
had very likely soured the German public on any dramatic leadership
other than the understated style of Der Alte, the grandfather image
of better times .
I . PERIODS OF ADENAUER'S PUBLIC CAREER
One of the most common pitfalls in assessing the legitimizing role
of a particular leader has always been the tendency to ignore the
various stages of the person's public career and to treat it as one
whole . When a leader has been in office for many years, in particu-
lar, this can be a fatal flaw of analysis . Konrad Adenauer's public
career in the Federal Republic alone calls for careful periodization
before we can apply any analytical scheme . There are probably many
ways of doing this . But it seems sufficient for our purposes here to
suggest a rough time schedule, as follows:
a) Pre-history : Adenauer's public career in Imperial and
Weimar Germany, including his brief reappointment in
1945 as mayor of Cologne.
b) Extraparliamentary Party Career : His role in helping to
organize first the Rheinland CDU and then the British
Zone CDU, his first springboards to national leadership.
c) Legislative Career Before September 1949 : The Parliamentary
Council 1948/1949.
d) The Struggling Chancellor : 1949-1953.
e) The Apogee of Power : 1953-1959.
f) Gradual Decline : 1959-1963.
g) Semi-Retirement : 1963-1967.
h) Posthumous Apotheosis : 1968-
The earlier phases of this career (a-c) were no doubt remarkable,
but he was not yet sufficiently known or successful to have much of
a public image or of an influence on the nations of legitimacy of
West Germans . Of course, the Federal Republic itself was barely
beginning to take shape in the constitutional deliberations of the
Parliamentary Council . On the other hand, he had already been very
active in building up the later governing party at least from his
geographical base towards ever-widening circles and had played a
major role in phases b) and c) in determining the alliances and
enmities that have made up the West German party to this day .(9) In
other words, he helped to shape the system in the minds of many
partisans if not of the voting masses.
In phase d), then, Adenauer's public image underwent the great change
which catapulted him from the relative obscurity of a provincial
party leader to the status of a veritable demiurge of German recov-
ery and international stature . It was in this period that he managed
to forge a vital link to American patronage, restored Germany's in-
ternational position, and came to benefit eventually from the econ-
omic recovery, all against considerable odds! At this point, the
voters began to reward him with unprecedented support, beginning in
1953 and again in 1957, and foreign observers and statesmen began to
praise him exorbitantly . To be sure, the stream of critical comments
on his "Chancellor democracy" also began to flow from this time on
and in inverse proportion to the consolidation of his political ma-
chine . There were not only complaints from political enemies, but
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even more from disappointed erstwhile allies such as his bourgeois
coalition parties which found themselves mistreated and ousted from
power as soon as he did not need their support anymore, between the
years 1955 and 1961.(10)
His decline began at about the time his foreign policy system began
to go out of style, with the impact of Sputnik and detente . The most
visible landmarks of this decline were the presidential crisis of
1959, when he toyed with the thought of making himself a
DeGaulle-like German Federal President, and the humiliating wrangling over
his survival as Chancellor in 1961 .(11) In 1963, finally, he was
forced to abdicate into semi-retirement as an elder statesman and
not always loyal follower of the new Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, with
whom the public naturally began to compare him . As we shall see below,
Adenauer's historic stature in the eyes of his countrymen really began
to grow beyond his best electoral showing only after he left office.
It reached its highest level with his death in 1967 and has remained
at a high level to this day.
When we speak of Adenauer's role in legitimizing the West German
system to the mass public, then, we are referring only to phases d)
through f) . While these years in power, and especially the first two
phases, seem to have been the period during which he must have left
this impression on the voting public, furthermore it took a substan-
tial time lag for this legitimizing role to leave its mark on overt
mass opinion . Thus the many observers may have been right who always
warned us during Adenauer's most successful years that the seeming
political stability of the Federal Republic was intimately tied to
the success and prosperity of the whole enterprise and might disinte-
grate at the first sign of a serious economic or political crisis .(12)
A sense of legitimacy seems to require considerable passage of time
and a knowledge of crises weathered and eras having passed . Adenauer
had to leave office and the Adenauer era had to fade away before its
impact seems to have surfaced in the minds of the public.
II . THREE PUBLIC OPINION CURVES IN SEARCH OF AN EXPLANATION
Let us take a closer look at the changing public perceptions of the
Adenauer phenomenon over time . Our data are the recurrent polls taken
by the Institut für Demoskopie (IFD) of Allensbach (13) which has kept
track of these perceptions since 1950, a year of crisis for the Chan-
cellor of the young republic, of mass unemployment and painful econo-
mic readjustments under the still unproven "social market" policies
of Ludwig Erhard . The outbreak of the Korean war particularly de-
pressed the mood of war-weary Germany . The pollsters asked a repre-
sentative, adult cross-section, "Are you by and large in agreement
with Adenauer's policies?" The positive responses fluctuated all year
around one fourth of the respondents and by November, 195o, reached
a nadir of 19%, while 41% expressed their disapproval .(14) This poor
rating continued through all of 1951 . In June of that year, moreover,
when his critics were asked for the reasons of their disapproval,
their most prevalent criticisms turned out to be "he is too obsequi-
ous with the Allies" (19%), "lacks a social conscience" (15%), "too
old" (12%), "too dependent on the church" (11%), and "his attitude to-
wards German rearmament" (7%)
. When asked, "Would it be better if
another man were to head the government?" a plurality of 35% said
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yes, 33% no .(15)
With the end of 1951, his approval rate suddenly rose to between 3o
and 4o% . By mid-1953, it had broken the So% level and, by the time
of the 1953 parliamentary elections, it had topped out at 57%, while
his CDU/CSU obtained a whopping 45 .2% of the popular vote and a ma-
jority of the seats of the Bundestag . Throughout the years 1954-1963,
the percentage approving of his policies in general remained between
4o and 55%, with occasional fluctuations .(16) There was a remarkable
concurrence between his party's popular vote and approval of his pol-
icies, compare Diagram 1.
It should be noted that even at the height of Adenauer's success, the
voting public was not as uncritical about his failings as might be
supposed . Objections to his advancing age, for example, were a major
factor as early as 1955 when 45% (vs . 31% who did not) would have
"preferred a younger man at the head of the government ." In 1956,
27% felt that he was "too old" and in 1959, when he was 82, 44% did
so . The same percentage, 44% (vs . 34% who did not), would have pre-
ferred another man as Chancellor just prior to the 1957 elections,
his greatest election victory ever . At the same time also, only 33%
expected him to continue his successes while an equal number felt
that his "greatest period is over but he will also achieve many great
things in the future ." By 1962, the desire for his resignation was
shared by 67% of a representative sample .(17)
What exactly was it then that accounted for his sudden surge of sup-
port in 1952/1953? The IFD pollsters asked the public to select "the
three points . . .most applicable to Adenauer" from a list, both before
the 1953 elections and two years later . The consensus was on (18)
February January
1953 1955
1) Adenauer is a good negotiator,
has restored Germany's reputa-
tion 55% 7o%
2) Adenauer wants to give us
security against the East 47% 51%
3) Adenauer has ensured that we
are better off economically 45% 55%
In the same poll, a negative consensus between 2o% and 35% character-
ized him as "tyrannical," lacking a social conscience, and a warmonger',
a package probably related to partisanship for the SPD . Further, 1956,
1957 and 1958 polls brought out very similar points on both sides,
with blocs of opinions pro and contra German rearmament surfacing for
the first time .(19) Thus, Adenauer had evidently been identified with
the accomplishment of important national tasks by the public.
The most significant tip-off of Adenauer's surging support in 1953
was the response to a question, "Do you think that Adenauer primarily
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
Diagramm	 1 : "Do you approve of Adenauer's policies?" and CDU/CSU vote, 1949-1963
1949
	
1950
	
1951
	
1952
	
1953
	
1954
	
1955
	
1956
	
1957
	
1958
	
1959
	
1960
	
1961
	
1962
	
1963
/
n /
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
I
	
\ I"
	
I
- 18 -
wants the best for Germany, or has he other interests that are more
important to him?" (August, 1953) : 66% of the sample (vs . lo% nega-
tive responses) felt he wanted the best for the country and this per-
centage was even higher among the better-educated (77%), FDP supporters
(82%) and, of course, CDU/CSU supporters (94%) .(2o) He had, quite
simply, won the confidence of the people in his sincere dedication
to their interests and thus created the emotional basis for their
turning over all their problems to his grandfatherly care .(21) As
Leon Dion has pointed out, followers are unlikely to place their
trust into a leader until they perceive him to be totally dedicated
to the interests of the group.
Did Adenauer's gradual decline after 1957 leave documentable evidence
in the IFD polls? Polls between 1955 and 1959, presenting a long list
of characteristics., show an undertow of picque as the years went on.
Positive features associated with him declined a little from 57% who
thought him clever in 1955 (only 44% in 1959), diplomatic 55% (43%),
industrious 43% (32%), purposeful 42% (35%), and likeable 3o% (22%).
Negative attributes rose perceptibly : Ambitious 35% (41%), cunning,
wily 3o% (35%), obstinate 2o% (33%), relentless 15% (25%), and tyran-
nical 13% (23%) . There was a notable edge to this trend which made the in-
creasing popular demand for his retirement more plausible . But no
sooner was he out of office, and especially after his death, than a
new note came into play : appreciation of Adenauer as a historical
figure . A poll of April 1968 with a list on "what were Adenauer's
greatest achievements" clearly shows the shift from the earlier,
pressing major policy topics to others of more reflective, human and
historic scope (we underscored those most relevant to the legitimacy
of the system)(22):
1) The repatriation of German POWs from Russia 75%
2) The reconciliation with France 70%
3) Having helped Germany to return to respect and
prestige in the world 65%
4) The efforts towards a united Europe 48%
5) Having made the Federal Republic a well-ordered
and stable democracy 47%
6) Having helped to make the Federal Republic an
independent state 46%
7) The reconciliation with Israel,
	
restitution to
the Jews 38%
8)
	
Incorporation of the Federal Republic into the
Western Alliance, NATO 35%
9) The efforts toward the foundation and strengthen-
ing of the Common Market 34%
10) Reincorporation of the Saar into the Federal
Republic 32%
11) The efforts toward German reunification 3o%
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12) Having been unyielding toward Russia, Communism
	
28%
13) The foundation of a great people's party, the CDU
	
24%
14) Building up the Bundeswehr
	
22%
15) Fighting for the "social market policy"
	
22%
This imposing list calls for a closer look . It is made up of three
distinctive types of issues : a) conscience issues which try to as-
suage the passions of the past (1 and 7), b) legitimacy issues which
will be examined more closely below (3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13 and 14),
and c) issues relating to Germany's new role in Europe and in the
world (2, 4, 8, 9 and 12) . The conscience issues are abviously of
the broadest application and could be compared, for instance, to the
concern with U .S . POWs and MIAs after the Vietnam war . They have
overtones also of the leader's total dedication to the self of the
nation . The European, Franco-German, and NATO issues have a strong
bearing on the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic because of Ade-
nauer's peculiar strategy for German rehabilitation : He resolved the
gigantic hangover of misguided German nationalism (which also relates
to 7, restitution to the Jews) by Europeanizing all German "national"
questions . Thus questions 2, 4, 9, 10 (Saar), and even the thorny
rearmament issues 8 and 14 became prerequisites for the foundation
of West German legitimacy . The very high support for reconciliation
with France shows the emotionally strategic role of being accepted
(albeit reluctantly) by the "archenemy" in the West . Even the Saar
appears on the list, which was intended to be Adenauer's national
sacrifice to mollify the French and turned into a policy failure for
him though the outcome was accepted all too willingly by the Germans.
The reverse side of the coin of Western acceptance was the rejection
of the Eastern side of Germany, of Soviet influence (#12) and, in an-
other curiously inverted formula, credit for efforts toward German
reunification which, of course, is in direct conflict with the com-
mon criticism that Adenauer did little for reunification.
Of the legitimacy issues proper, the most central are 5, 6 and 3 . In-
ternal order and stability, national independence, and international
respect are facets of the sense of legitimacy which cover its essence.
In the preamble to its 1949 constitution, the Federal Republic had
solemnly looked forward to its eventual replacement by an all-German
state and for twenty years had been moaning about the fatal flaw of
the German division . (23) This was an overwhelming manifesto of legi-
timacy, and it was associated with Adenauer by one half to two thirds
of the public in 1968.
The last of the three curves (the first was general policy support
and the second the CDU/CSU vote during his tenure) is that of the
public perception of Adenauer as a historic figure (Diagram 2) con-
trasted to other German statesmen . It is a simple picture : The re-
sponses naming Adenauer "the great German who has done the most for
Germany" rose from zero (24) and began to top the slowly declining
curve of the diehards still naming Hitler only in 1953, the year of
his first great landslide . In 1953, it will be recalled, his policy
approval had broken the 50% mark and the CDU/CSU vote had risen to
45 .2%, thanks to him .(25) Between January 1956 and October 1958, cu-
riously at a time when his general policy approval began to dip below
10
Diagram 2 : "In Your Opinion, Which Great German Has Done The Most for Germany?"
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5o% even though he still won his biggest election victory in 1957
(5o .2%), the public perceptions of his historic stature caught up
with those of the towering figure of Bismarck, the founder of the
Reich
. Still, only 26% of the public gave him that accolade at a
time when his vote and policy approval ran nearly twice as high
.(26)
The rise of the historic image then occurred mostly during his years
of semiretirement, possibly highlighted against the floundering of
his successors Erhard and Kiesinger amid various economic and poli-
tical crises .(27)
The Institut für Demoskopie took another look at the Adenauer image
in December of 1975 and noted with surprise that the numbers expres-
sing an opinion had grown (85% to 93%) and most of the features at-
tributed to him had become sweetened over time : Considerably more
people called him clever, purposeful, ambitious than in 1959 and
fewer regarded him as domineering, ruthless, or egotistical
. Better
yet, the 1975 respondents thought of qualities few could discover in
him back in 1959 such as honest, kind and charming (liebenswürdig).
By this time also, his historical stature as the "great German who did
the most for Germany" had been confirmed further in polls in April
1975 and April 1976, which gave him 43% and 51% respectively, while
Bismarck dropped to 14% and lo%.
For comparison with contemporary rivals, there were the historic curves
of Ludwig Erhard and Willy Brandt . Erhard's curve had started at 4% in
1962, peaked at 9% in 1966 (the time of his fall) and then declined
again to 4% in 1967 and 2% in 1976 . Brandt's historic stature had
first been acknowledged with 2% in 1969, when he became Chancellor,
rose to 11% in 1975, when he resigned, and still stood at 8% in 1976.
(28) Unfortunately, there was no poll taken in 1972 when he was at
his zenith with his Ostpolitik
. Brandt's image has to be seen not
only against the background of the Ostpolitik with which 47% (vs . 23%
who were satisfied) professed disappointment by the end of 1975.
Brandt and Adenauer (29) have to be understood in the context of the
momentous shift of opinion on East and West which occurred in the
early seventies : Whereas West Germans had always seen the West as in
the long run stronger than Russia, this balance changed after 1969.
Polls of 1973 and 1975 produced only 14% and 13%, respectively, who
thought that in fifty years America would be stronger than Russia,
while 32% and 37%, respectively, took the opposite view
. 57% (vs . 6%
who did not) thought in February 1976 that the East was already
stronger today . And 49% (vs
. 25% who wanted to fight for their way
of life even if it meant a nuclear war) thought that it would be bet-
ter to avoid war even if it meant living under Communism .(3o) This
deeply-rooted German fear of war was hardly new,(31) but the balance
of the opinions on this "better-red-than-dead" question had been rath-
er even in 1955, 1956, and 1959, and leaning toward fighting rather
than submitting to the Soviets . Thus, Adenauer's policies aligning
the Federal Republic with Nato and against the East must seem like
a great mistake to today's West German public while Brandt's policy
of detente makes more sense
. What does all this have to do with Ade-
nauer's legitimizing role with regards to the political system? His
post-retirement and posthumous image continues to be linked with the
establishment of a West German sense of legitimacy
. In December 1975,
the pollsters again came up with the list of his "greatest achieve-
ments" and received responses similar to those of eight years ear-
lier :(32) (Legitimacy issues underscored) :
- 22 -
1) The repatriation of German POWs from Russia
	
66%
2) Having helped Germany to return to respect and
prestige in the world (no . 3 in 1968)
	
64%
3) The reconciliation with France
	
62%
4) Having made the Federal Republic a well-
ordered and stable democracy
	
54%
5) Having helped to make the Federal Republic an
independent state so soon (no . 6 in 1968)
	
53%
6) The efforts toward a united Europe
	
43%
7) Incorporation of the Federal Republic into the
Western Alliance, NATO (no . 8 in 1968)
	
39%
8) Reincorporation of the Saar into the Federal
Republic (no .	 lo in 1968)
	
37%
9) Foundation of a great people's party, the CDU
(no . 13 in 1968)
	
37%
10) Efforts toward German reunification
(no .	 11	 in 1968)
	
34%
11) Having been unyielding towards Russia, Communism 34%
12) Reconciliation with Israel, restitution to the
Jews (no . 7 in 1968)
	
31%
13) Efforts toward the foundation and strengthening
of the Common Market (no . 9 in 1968)
	 30%
14) Fighting for the "social market policy"
	
30%
15) Building up the Bundeswehr
	
30%
What is remarkable about this reiteration of the eight-year old ques-
tion is that, while the conscience and European issues have somewhat
declined, the questions of legitimacy have gone up by a substantial
margin . More Germans than ever credited Adenauer with having given
the Federal Republic legitimacy in its domestic order and in the eyes
of the world . Oddly enough, his unyieldingly anti-Communist course
and rearmament also received higher ratings in spite of the new wil-
lingness to seek an accommodation with Soviet might . His role in the
foundation of the state-building party of the first twenty years,
the CDU, likewise received an even higher rating than eight years
earlier .
III . LEGITIMACY EQUALS FLESHPOTS, PARTIES, AND THE RODEO
Even if we grant that legitimacy can grow from the successful tenure
of leadership by one prominent figure, it would still be of great
interest to know just how this process works . There are several like-
ly approaches . A number of years ago, we argued two of these theories,
a fleshpot theory and a party competition theory of legitimacy . The
fleshpot theory was also based on public opinion data, namely the re-
sponses to the question at what time the country had been best off.
In 1951, more than one half of those polled still felt it had been
before 1933, and especially in the "good old days" before 1914, while
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the rest (save 1/5o who said "now") opted for the 1933-1939 period.
By 1959, better than four in ten said "now," while less than half
dreamt of the past . By 1964, the number saying "now" had grown to
62% and only one fourth was still living in the past . This prosaic
vote of confidence in the present was not to be scoffed at, although
it had its vulnerable point in the possibility of economic crisis.
In fact, perhaps it was only after the system had weathered its
first recession in 1966/1967 that one could consider it enduring.
There were also other supporting data such as the six out of seven
Germans--as compared to only 2/3 of Frenchmen, one half of Americans,
and 2/5 of Englishmen--who were satisfied with their country's posi-
tion in the world .(33)
The party competition theory was based on the common experience that
the competition of moderate parties by itself trends to legitimize
the system and the rules of the game . If two rivaling movements fight
each other for leadership in the system, each of them implicitly ac-
cepts the system as a legitimate arena . There is also a great deal of
prima facie evidence that Adenauer's electoral successes had an enor-
mous impact on the SPD, forcing it out of its ideological shell until,
in 1959, it became a people's party . Quite typically for the legiti-
mizing process, the SPD found that it first had to accept the major
outlines of Adenauer's policies before it could present meaningful
options and alternatives . In the end, the SPD as a people's party
proved more than a match for the CDU/CSU, and thus was able to re-
place the latter at the helm of the state . From that day on, in 1969,
the Federal Republic had left the egg shells of Adenauer's alleged
authoritarian rule behind and become an alternating party system .(34)
Since we are discussing the party system, it should also be noted how
Adenauer's political machine in its build-up managed to strengthen
and simplify the party system . He eliminated one by one most of the
other bourgeois parties, or forced them into becoming client parties
of the CDU/CSU . His policies helped to absorb the potentially explo-
sive political mass basis of the millions of eastern refugees and
other malcontented elements, such as former Nazis . Extremist parties
of the right and left simply had no chance against the mighty Adenau-
er machine . For a new republic with the legacies of Weimar and the
Third Reich, this organizational build-up was abviously better for
the developing legitimacy than a splintering of political forces
would have been.
Last but not least in the partisan arena, we need to juxtapose Edin-
ger's central actor, Adenauer, to the rivals he had in his own party
and in the opposition . The personal confrontations between Adenauer
and Kurt Schumacher alone, with their contrasting styles and bitter
invective, helped to create a whole political world between their
clashing personalities . Even his old-fashioned Wilhelminian author-
itarianism in a way helped to restore the German faith in democracy
which had served them so poorly in the Weimar Republic . To quote
David Conradt, (35)
Adenauer did make a major contribution toward the institu-
tionalization of the Federal Republic in that he convinced
most citizens that a "republic" could be strong and effec-
tive, that strong state authority and firm leadership could
operate within a democratic framework and give West Germans
what they desperately wanted in the postwar period :security
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and economic prosperity . Through his authoritarian, patern-
alistic style, he sold West Germans on the Second Republic.
Finally, there is the rodeo theory of the legitimizing leader . The
longer the leader can stay in the saddle of the bucking politics of
a new country, the greater the leader's contribution to the legiti-
macy of the system . Short-term leaders hardly have time to make
themselves known . Anyone staying atop a new republic for as long as
Adenauer did--nearly as long as the entire Weimar republic lasted--
must leave his or her mark on the system . After all, this is how
the monarchic dynasties of old acquired legitimacy . And if he, on
top of his endurance, takes on and resolves important and major tasks
perceived by the public, such as giving the system external security,
prosperity, and international respect, he has created a "working
system," as legitimate as they come.
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